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This article seeks to investigate how developing countries can ensure that
algorithmic decision-making does not leave protected groups in their jurisdictions
exposed to unlawful discrimination that would be almost impossible to prevent or
prove. The article shows that universally, longstanding methods used to prevent
and prove discrimination will struggle when confronted with algorithmic
decision-making. It then argues that while some of the proposed solutions to this
issue are promising, they cannot be successfully implemented in a vast majority of
developing countries because these countries lack the necessary institutional
foundation. The key features of this institutional foundation include: (i) a wellrooted culture of transparency and statistical analysis of the disparities faced by
protected groups; (ii) vigilant non-government actors attentive to algorithmic
decision-making; and (iii) a reasonably robust and proactive executive branch or
an independent office to police discrimination. This article argues that
antidiscrimination advocates need to pay special attention to these three issues to
ensure that the use of algorithms in developing countries is contemplative and
avoidant of proven negative and discriminatory outcomes.
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I.

Introduction

A rich body of research arguing that discrimination is wrong for both
deontological1 and teleological2 reasons explains the motivation this research of
many countries around the world that have set out protected characteristics upon
which discrimination by both public and private decision-makers is prohibited.3
Many developing countries have likewise done so through their constitutions and
other legislation, but seem to end their commitment there given that detection and
action is left to the injured party.4 That some part of this tenuous situation has
held up (with some discrimination suits still being successfully brought before
courts) has more to do with the fact that human conduct is what has been at play
so far. The use of algorithms to make decisions further complicates the process of
identifying and remedying when discrimination has occurred.
While the use of machine-learning algorithms to make hugely
consequential predictions and decisions continues to gain ground,5 questions
about how to police the fairness of such decisions and reduce the disparities faced
by marginalized people in protected classes abound.6 The discourse around these
questions is burgeoning in developed countries but remains insufficient in
developing countries.7 The gap is particularly eye-catching since the use of
algorithms to make decisions is taking root in the developing world nearly as

1

In recent years, scholarly output touching on the deontological reasons for determining wrongful
discrimination has been rich and outstanding. See, eg., DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS
DISCRIMINATION WRONG? (2008); PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION
LAW (Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau, eds., 2013); BENJAMIN EIDELSON, DISCRIMINATION
AND DISRESPECT (2015); TARUNABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION
(2015); FOUNDATIONS OF INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION (Hugh Collins & Raunabh Khaitan, eds.,
2018).
2
There is also work that focuses on consequentialist reasons. See, e.g., Richard
McAdams, Economic Theories of Discrimination, in THE EMPIRE OF DISGUST: PREJUDICE,
DISCRIMINATION, AND POLICY IN INDIA AND THE US 369, 374 (Hasan et al. eds., 2019).
3
See KHAITAN, supra note 1, at 49–62.
4
See Karen Yeung, Why Worry About Decision-Making by Machine?, in ALGORITHMIC
REGULATION 21, 22 (Karen Yeung & Martin Lodge eds., 2019).
5
Id. at 35–48.
6
Id. at 41–42.
7
See Lindsey Anderson, Artificial Intelligence in International Development: Avoiding Ethical
Pitfalls, 30 PRINCETON UNIV. J. PUB. & INT’L AFF. (May 20,
2019), https://jpia.princeton.edu/news/artificial-intelligence-international-development-avoidingethical-pitfalls.
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quickly as it is in the developed world.8 In any case, global capitalism’s history
counsels us to expect that people in the developing world will endure aggressive
targeting by corporations which profit from selling tools that deploy algorithms in
decision-making.9
Because of the significant efficiency gaps and low standard of wellbeing
developing countries have to contend with10, these nations readily sympathize
with the argument that tools that use algorithmic decision-making should be
allowed to freely operate on the basis that the likely benefits outweigh the costs.11
This claim is powerful, but flawed in seeing people only as a group.12
Additionally, there is a risk that such tools raise the standards of wellbeing for
already-privileged groups of people while expanding inequalities suffered by
marginalized people in protected classes.13 As a result, the ‘good’ delivered by
efficiency is in many cases not good enough.14
To further complicate the picture, algorithmic decision-making is creating
new challenges for longstanding approaches of preventing and proving direct or
indirect discrimination (also referred to hereafter as disparate treatment and
disparate impact, respectively). There is now convincing evidence that approaches
for preventing discrimination in algorithms which require proof of causation, and
significant correlation or exclusion of inputs are no longer tenable, meaning that
detection of discrimination requires complicated examination of processes.15
Moreover, while parties that deploy disparate impact algorithms can easily come
up with a legal justification for the values and characteristics that the algorithm
detects, those individuals that are discriminated against will find it exceedingly

8

Several algorithmic tools already operate in countries like Kenya and India, taking part in among
others credit-scoring, assignment of housing, school placement and predicative policy. For more
information, see What Determines my Tala Loan?, TALA BLOG (February 10, 2020),
https://tala.co.ke/2020/10/02/what-determines-my-tala-loan/.
9
See Abeba Berhane, Algorithmic Colonization of Africa, 17 SCRIPTED 389, 392–93 (2020).
10
See Jona Hoxhaj & Eglantina Hysa, Well-being in Developing Countries 10–11 (2015
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308112884_Well-being_in_Developing_Countries.
11
Shakir Mohamed et. al, Decolonial AI: Decolonial Theory as Sociotechnical Foresight in
Artificial Intelligence, 33 PHIL. & TECH. 1, 13 (2020).
12
Deborah Hellman, Measuring Algorithmic Fairness, 106 VA. L. REV. 811, 842–43 (2020).
13
See Chinmayi Arun, AI and the Global South: Designing for Other Worlds, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF ETHICS OF AI 589, 600 (Markus Dubber, Frank Pasquale & Sunit Das eds., 2020).
14
Ben Green, “Good” Isn’t Good Enough 2–3 (2019) (NeurIPS Joint Workshop on AI for Soc.
Good, Workshop Paper).
15
Andrea Tsamados et al., The Ethics of Algorithms: Key Problems and Solutions, AI & SOC., at
1, 5 (2021).
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hard to prove that another approach exists that would achieve the purpose of the
algorithm without having a discriminatory impact.16
The latest solutions for ex ante and ex post scrutiny of algorithmic
decision-making seem promising but rest on a foundation that necessitates: (i) a
well-rooted culture of transparency and statistical analysis of the disparities faced
by protected groups17; (ii) vigilant non-government actors attentive to algorithmic
decision-making18; and (iii) reasonably robust and proactive independent or
executive branch regulatory policing of discrimination.19
This article will show that the current discourse surrounding solutions to
algorithmic discrimination is not attuned to the situation in a vast majority of
developing countries. These developing countries often lack rich statistical
analyses on the disparities faced by protected groups, and struggle with
negligible. Furthermore, it is common for civil society groups to show little
interest in algorithmic decision-making and the administrative state plays no
identifiable role in policing discrimination. This article argues that if these issues
are ignored while algorithmic decision-making is allowed to take root in those
countries, the result might be a future of increased disparities faced by groups
which the individuals and institutions of the country have already marginalized. 20
Under the assumption that the age of algorithmic decision-making is to
result in narrower disparities and less discriminatory conduct suffered by the
protected groups in developing countries, I propose that policymakers,
lawmakers, researchers, donors, and civic activists need to invest their wealth and
efforts on mitigating the discriminatory impact of algorithmic decision-making. In
an era where algorithmic tools are primarily designed by “people from the
North,”21 the perspective that this study presents will also point out questions that
developers need to consider as they design algorithmic tools.

16

See Arun, supra note 13, at 601.
See Tsamados et al., supra note 15, at 2, 5, 10.
18
See Laurie Clarke, Algorithms: The age of self-regulation could be ending, TECH
MONITOR (Feb. 3, 2021), https://techmonitor.ai/ai/algorithms-self-regulation-could-be-ending.
19
See Press Release, Senator Markey, Rep. Matsui Introduce Legislation to Combat Harmful
Algorithms and Create New Online Transparency Regime, (May 27, 2021),
https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senator-markey-rep-matsui-introducelegislation-to-combat-harmful-algorithms-and-create-new-online-transparency-regime.
20
See Arun, supra note 13, at 603–04 (arguing that vulnerable “southern” populations are
particularly at risk).
21
Id. at 601.
17
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This article will touch on discrimination by algorithms used by public and
private bodies. Further, the article aims at the substantive rather than procedural
goal of anti-discrimination law.22 It will proceed as follows. Section II will
consider unlawful discrimination in algorithmic decision-making, including how
it arises and why the longstanding approaches that countries use to prevent and
prove discrimination wither when confronted by algorithms. In Section III, the
article will review the most promising approaches designed to ameliorate the
challenge that algorithmic decision-making poses. This section will also discuss
the foundation required for the success of those approaches. Section IV of the
article will demonstrate that the foundation required for the successful
implementation of the approaches does not exist in a vast majority of developing
countries. It will also propose the way forward. Finally, the article concludes in
Section V.

II.

Unlawful Discrimination in Algorithmic Decision-Making
a.

How Discrimination in Algorithmic Decision-Making
Arises

At its essence, machine learning involves the development of algorithms
which enable a computerized system to analyze a dataset and yield functions (also
known as rules or models that are deterministic mappings from a set of input
values to one or more output values).23 On the other hand, algorithms can simply
be defined as complex processes that a computer follows to reach decisions.24 In
machine learning, an initial algorithm gives the computerized system a function
that guides its analysis of complex datasets to find recurring patterns.25 From the
captured patterns, the computerized system creates another algorithm with an
updated function, and uses this function to analyze and reach decisions or
predictions about similar real-life datasets.26

22

This is an important caveat because a focus on the procedural goal, or both the procedural and
substantive goals, would necessarily force the research into a different direction. For example,
procedural justice may demand the omission of any input data which contains protected
characteristics and proxies as an end in itself. This study is not concerned with that. It is instead
focused on the substantive result of preventing discrimination on the basis of protected
characteristics.
23
JOHN D. KELLEHER, DEEP LEARNING 6–7 (2019).
24
See Algorithms and Complexity, BRITTANICA, https://www.britannica.com/science/computerscience/Algorithms-and-complexity (last visited Oct. 6, 2021).
25
See KELLEHER, supra note 23, at 7.
26
Jon Kleinberg et al., Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms, 10 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 113, 132
(2019) (referring to the first algorithm as the “trainer” and the second one as the “screener”).
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The journey to creating—or constantly updating—the algorithm that gives
the final prediction or decision is known as “training.”27 In the course of training,
the initial algorithm processes a dataset (known as the training dataset) and comes
up with the function which best matches the patterns in the dataset.28 That
function is then encoded in the computer as a model29 to be used by the other
algorithm to make inferences out of new datasets. While the model that emerges
usually captures patterns, associations, or correlations in a dataset, it does not
explain the cause or nature of these links.30
It would be naïve and dangerous to believe that algorithms make decisions
(inferences) in an objective and bias-free way.31 So long as any aspect of
algorithms’ connection of patterns and correlations in the big data they assess is in
any manner dependent on human interpretation,32 they cannot be bias-free.
Because existing bias is often the result of long histories of structural injustice, it
is difficult to extricate it out of the training datasets fed into machine-learning
algorithms, especially since such a move might reduce the accuracy of inferences
that an algorithm makes.33 The bias is of course not always wrong or unlawful—
however, the bias becomes unlawful when it reaches a point that the government
has prohibited under anti-discrimination law.34
Algorithmic discrimination can arise out of one or a combination of the
following: modelling, training, and usage. In modelling, consider that large and
complex datasets usually present more than one fitting function to an algorithm.
To help the algorithm select an exact function, human beings supplement the
information provided by the dataset with a series of assumptions about the
characteristics of the best function. This is what is known as an inductive bias.35
For instance, a screening algorithm for employees will be designed in line with
human classification of which candidate fits the description of a “good” employee
and which one does not. Not only are such inductive biases bound to include

27

Id.
See What is Training Data?, APPEN (June 28, 2021), https://appen.com/blog/training-data/.
29
KELLEHER, supra note 23, at 13.
30
Thomas Nachbar, Algorithmic Fairness, Algorithmic Discrimination, 48 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
509, 521 (2021).
31
Kleinberg et al., supra note 26, at 116.
32
Naturally, this is nearly always the case since the dataset used to train an algorithm will not only
implicitly carry the structural injustices in a society, but it is also often selected and prepared by
human beings with biases.
33
Kleinberg et al., supra note 26, at 116
34
DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 1–4 (2011).
35
KELLEHER, supra note 23, at 18–19.
28
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some prejudices, but they might also contain sensitive information that reveals
protected characteristics36 or proxies for protected characteristics.37
Training machine-learning algorithms comes with similar risks since an
algorithm is likely to inherit the prejudices and biases within the datasets used to
train them, whether via supervised or unsupervised learning.38 Even where the
training takes place ‘online’, which is where an algorithm is released into an
environment to try out different policies and functions (training and inference are
therefore interleaved), there remains the danger that the environment may not be
sufficiently representative.39 Finally, when algorithms are used in environments
for which they were not specially modelled and trained, they can have
discriminatory consequences. Take for example an algorithm modelled and
trained for a setting in country A and then used for a setting in country B without
any careful adjustments being made. Such an algorithm could easily discriminate
against some protected groups in country B.
The end result is that various problems of discrimination could arise out of
an algorithm’s decisions and predictions. To begin, algorithms may engage in
disparate treatment by actively considering a person’s protected characteristics or
using proxies to arrive at those characteristics. They may also have a disparate
impact on vulnerable protected groups based on some aspect of their modelling,
training, and usage. Finally, their decisions may increase disparities in a way that
many would deem unfair.40
Although human decision-making can also be discriminatory,
discrimination by machine-learning algorithms is far more worrisome than human
discrimination. Machine-learning algorithms, as Natalia Criado and Jose Such
have so starkly observed, “have the potential to discriminate more consistently,
systematically and at a larger scale than traditional discriminatory practices.”41
Part of the reason for this is that the efficiency which computational decisionmakers offer makes them very attractive, which in turn means that where their use
is widespread, any discriminatory effect they have will appear in many identical
iterations in rapid succession—essentially discrimination on a ‘grand’ scale.42 It is
36

NATALIA CRIADO & JOSE SUCH, DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION 85 (Karen Yeung & Martin Lodge
eds., 2019).
37
Anya Prince & Daniel Shwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial Intelligence and
Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1273–81 (2020).
38
CRIADO & SUCH, supra note 36, at 86.
39
Id.
40
Kleinberg et al., supra note 26, at 139.
41
CRIADO & SUCH, supra note 36, at 85.
42
Nachbar, supra note 30, at 533.
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no wonder algorithmic decision-making is drawing special attention from all
those interested in antidiscrimination.
b.

Why Longstanding Approaches to Preventing and
Proving Discrimination are Inadequate

The challenges that algorithmic decision-making creates for legal analyses
are in many ways analogous to those which technologies such as the telegraph,
the internet, DNA identification and synthetic biology created when they first
appeared on the scene. Surveying responses to the emergence of technologies
such as the telegraph, the internet, DNA identification, and synthetic biology, one
of the chief lessons Gregory Mandel notes is that often, pre-existing legal
categories may no longer apply to new law and technology disputes.43 This lesson
comes to life when one tries to apply longstanding approaches of detecting
discrimination onto algorithmic decision-making.
Most approaches to detecting discrimination are designed to find out and
prevent direct use of protected characteristics in decision-making and t allowing
apparently neutral decisions to have a lopsidedly negative impact on protected
groups without acceptable justification.44 Antidiscrimination law in almost every
country still requires that successful litigants prove (at least) some significant
correlation45 between the protected characteristic and the decision made; or
between a specific factor/ policy and the lopsidedly negative impact it has on
protected groups.46 For human decisions, this has often been possible to prove
even if imperfectly.47 The same cannot be said of decisions made by algorithms.
The complexity of the manner in which algorithms find patterns, create
functions and arrive at inferences makes it difficult for individuals to confidently
pinpoint the input or proxy that is causing discrimination or which has any
significant correlation to the discrimination.48 To make matters worse, dynamic
self-learning algorithms modify the functions they use regularly.49 For these
reasons, it is no longer possible to point out with any precision which inputs are
43

GREGORY MANDEL, LEGAL EVOLUTION IN RESPONSE TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 227–38
(Roger Brownsword et al. eds., 2017).
44
Nachbar, supra note 30, at 535.
45
KHAITAN, supra note 1, at 169.
46
Id. at 69–71, 166–67.
47
Kleinberg et al., supra note 26, at 130.
48
Nicole Posner, The Hidden Dangers of Algorithmic Decision-Making, TOWARDS DATA
SCIENCE (Dec. 1, 2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/the-hidden-dangers-in-algorithmicdecision-making-27722d716a49.
49
Anupman Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1039 (2017).
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responsible for some disparate treatment or impact,50 which is exactly the sort of
connection most legal tests require of a litigant attempting to prove
discrimination.51 Under these circumstances, it is nearly impossible for litigants to
prove that discrimination has occurred without some change in antidiscrimination
law.
In almost every country, antidiscrimination law also tries to protect the
vulnerable by prohibiting certain distinctions motivated by the consideration of
protected characteristics.52 Such an approach is likewise likely to be pointless
when it comes to algorithmic decision-making. Regulation that prescribes for the
exclusion of protected characteristics from the input data which algorithmic tools
can consider will achieve little from the standpoint of substantive justice since
algorithms can still recover the protected information (as it almost certainly
remains embedded in the non-excluded data).53 In that case, protected
characteristics would still be used implicitly. It is important to note that there is no
exclusionary approach that shows any promise—even if we attempt to go further
and eliminate the use of proxies for protected characteristics, algorithms will still
analyze the available data in a way that recovers the sensitive aspects.54
If the case laid out in the preceding paragraph is not convincing enough,
there is yet another reason why exclusionary approaches are undesirable. There is
strong evidence to show that insisting on such approaches could lead to increased
disparities since algorithms successfully prevented from using protected
characteristics will have no choice but to impose one interpretation for both the
most privileged and most marginalized groups.55 The end result would be the loss
of opportunities to mitigate the harms of already-biased measurement.56
Moreover, algorithmic decisions made in such environments would be far more
difficult to scrutinize.57
An approach focused on ring-fencing the types of input data that
algorithms can consider will suffer a fate that is similar to the exclusionary
approaches, which should not come as a surprise given that ring-fencing is
50

Talia Gillis, The Input Fallacy, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 41–66),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3571266.
51
KHAITAN, supra note 1, at 69–71.
52
See Sophia Moreau, What is Discrimination? 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 143 (2010).
53
Gillis, supra note 50 (manuscript at 48–49).
54
See Prince & Shwarcz, supra note 37, at 1302–04.
55
Gillis, supra note 50 (manuscript at 53–54).
56
Id. (manuscript at 48–52).
57
Betsy Williams et al., How Algorithms Discriminate Based on Data They Lack: Challenges,
Solutions, and Policy Implications, 8 J. INFO. POL’Y 78, 82–90 (2018).
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fundamentally exclusionary. In fact, approaches tethered to ring-fencing may only
serve to make the predictions and decisions of many algorithms less accurate than
they can be when a larger size and richer variety of inputs are made available.58
Such a declined level of correct inferencing would obviously discourage the use
of algorithms to make decisions, even when doing so would increase efficiency or
increase access to resources for marginalized people.59
Once again relying on antidiscrimination law’s longstanding interest in
policing the factors that may be considered in decision-making, some have urged
for legal frameworks that allow or compel designers to alter input data to combat
discrimination,60 a certain kind of input-data-focused affirmative action. This is a
flawed approach to the extent that it is founded on the presumption that the
problem lies only within the input data. It is also unlikely to be effective because
no matter the amount of ex ante data-tinkering that takes place, one can never be
certain how an algorithm will perform until it is run in a real environment.
Litigants who allege indirect discrimination from algorithmic decisionmaking face one more understated problem. Once disparate impact is
satisfactorily demonstrated, multiple legal frameworks give the liable party an
opportunity to offer a justification for the decision that caused the disparate
impact.61 Then the party alleging discrimination must show the existence of an
alternative decision which would achieve the justificatory aims of the accused
party without that disparate impact.62 We can safely assume that the party
deploying the algorithm will offer justification that hovers around issues of
efficiency and expanded opportunity (for both their entity and those they serve).63
In the face of this reality, what alternative decision can the party alleging
discrimination propose? Without access to expert computer scientists and details
58

See Gillis, supra note 50 (manuscript at 61–62).
See Kleinberg et al., supra note 26, at 120 (describing potential for improved pretrial release
outcomes for marginalized groups); Williams et al., supra note 57, at 86 (stating “[w]hen data are
‘big,’ unknown data points are more easily filled in through prediction, imputation, and proxies.”).
60
See Ignacio Cofone, Algorithmic Discrimination is an Information Problem, 70 HASTINGS
L.J. 1389, 1393–94, 1410–24 (2019).
61
KHAITAN, supra note 1, at 75–76 (discussing US, UK, and EU examples of justification for
indirect discrimination); see also Hugh Collins, Justice for Foxes: Fundamental Rights and
Justification of Indirect Discrimination, in FOUNDATIONS OF INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 249, 251–55 (Hugh Collins & Tarunabh Khaitan eds., 2018).
62
Outside the United States, this burden-shifting is known as the proportionality
test. See KHAITAN, supra note 1, at 181 (describing the proportionality test);
see Collins, supra note 61, at 254 (noting potentially legitimate purposes for rules with disparate
impact such as “improving the efficiency of the business or the effectiveness of a service”); see
generally KHAITAN, supra note 1, at 124 (describing societal power imbalance dynamics).
63
See KHAITAN, supra note 1, at 181 (describing the proportionality test).
59
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about how the algorithm made its decision, the party alleging discrimination faces
a remarkably distorted power imbalance.64
Is the challenge posed by algorithmic decision-making different from that
which human decision-making has always presented? Kleinberg and others have
argued that human decision-making features more opacity and algorithms may be
less of a challenge to the antidiscrimination project.65 Although there is some
truth in their assertion, there are two reasons why we still need to be concerned
with algorithmic decision-making. First, while antidiscrimination law has over
time developed tools to assess human decisions, those methods—without
modification—fall short when it comes to algorithmic decisions.66 We therefore
have no choice but to grapple with the problem and fashion new approaches.
Second, as previously stated in this part, the scale of discrimination that can come
from algorithmic decisions dwarfs that which may come from human decisionmaking.67 This is enough reason for us to take it very seriously.

III.

The Most Promising Proposed Solutions and the Foundation
Required for Successful Implementation
a.

Major Proposed Solutions

There are two broad frames organizing the most promising proposed
solutions: a) measures focused on auditing the software, code, or function and b)
measures focused on auditing outcomes. In this part of the article, I will review
these solutions. I will then argue that the foundation required to successfully
implement them needs to have: i) existing statistical analysis that allows one to
examine whether disparities faced by protected groups are increasing or
decreasing; ii) a certain degree of transparency to allow review of algorithm
design as well as the impact of the decisions they make; iii) a well-resourced,
democratically legitimate institution that can vigorously police discrimination and
iv) the existence of vigilant civil society groups that devote resources and time to
algorithmic decision-making.

64

See Collins, supra note 61, at 254 (noting potentially legitimate purposes for rules
with disparate impact such as “improving the efficiency of the business or the effectiveness of a
service”).
65
Kleinberg et al., supra note 26, at 154.
66
See generally Joshua Kroll et al., Accountable
Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017) (discussing the lag in legal accountability
for algorithmic decision-making).
67
CRIADO & SUCH, supra note 36, at 85.
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1.

Ex Ante Scrutiny

The goal is to build algorithms in a way that ensures non-discrimination.
For two particular reasons, the obstacles to that goal are considerable. First, the
question of how much bias counts as discrimination is still highly disputatious.68
Second, it is difficult to translate policy goals into terms specific enough to be
reduced to code,69 especially in a climate with little agreement about what
constitutes discrimination. As a result, one could find some technical tools which
protect against one understanding of discrimination yet allow for others.70 There
is no way to test with certainty whether new algorithms contain biases to a degree
that would lead them to unlawfully discriminate.71 Nevertheless, there has been
serious progress towards instituting techniques to confirm whether algorithms
satisfy non-discrimination norms. Some are automated computational methods
designed by computer science researchers and engineers, while others are
proposals made by legal scholars.
The standout feature of ex ante scrutiny is its reliance on methods which
allow stakeholders to ensure algorithms do not discriminate before letting them
run in any environment.72 Situations that are amenable to ex ante scrutiny are
referred to as white box scenarios.73 Those instances require that: i) the code “can
be inspected and comprehended” (for example, a decision tree can illustrate the
algorithm’s function), or ii) the training data sets that were used are widely
available.74 Recent computer science research proposes two ways to successfully
conduct ex ante scrutiny of algorithms. The first is a model-checking approach,
where “non-discrimination norms are operationalized as formal properties.”75 The
second is the mathematical approach, in which “non-discrimination norms are
operationalized as mathematical formulas defined over data sets.”76 They offer a
promising starting point for effectively responding to our problem.

68

Id. at 92.
Pauline Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 189, 192 (2017).
70
See id. at 193–94.
71
CRIADO & SUCH, supra note 36, at 92.
72
See id. at 95; Cofone, supra note 60, at 1440.
73
CRIADO & SUCH, supra note 36, at 95.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
69

51

Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet — Vol. 13

Both approaches can play a key role in assessing the functions which a
machine learning algorithm is to use,77 even though interpretability remains a
major problem.78 The amount of important information that can be extracted from
the function will depend on the kind of question asked and the type of algorithm
involved. While it would still be impossible to be sure exactly how the algorithm
will run in its target environment, these methods would make it possible to
examine what Gillis and Spiess refer to as “the facilitation of discriminatory
decisions.”79
Although some claim that transparency offers limited returns80 and may be
unnecessary,81 the success of methods of ex ante scrutiny largely depends on
transparency within the process. To some degree, key stakeholders need access to
details regarding an algorithm’s training data sets or function-creation before it is
deployed to make decisions affecting human lives.82 Such transparency can also
be crucial for other ex ante strategies such as examining objectives or assessing
the inductive bias of an algorithm.83
Consider the examination of objectives. According to Kleinberg and
others, regulation of algorithms should pay attention to the human choices behind:
i) what outcome an algorithm is designed to decide; ii) what inputs are made
available to an algorithm; and iii) the training procedure that is used.84 The
authors make the case that transparency is crucial for the scrutiny of these three
objectives. According to them, the key is instituting regulation that requires
detailed record-keeping by anyone who designs an algorithm, a move which other
scholars have likewise called for.85 Of course, such a move would still be
77
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toothless in the face of the changing relevance of the dataset on which the
algorithm is built, and the costs of compliance.86 Whatever the case, transparency
could go some way towards enabling ex ante scrutiny of objectives in a manner
that prevents discrimination.
Evaluating the inductive bias used by algorithms could be another
concrete goal of ex ante scrutiny. As stated earlier in this article, inductive bias
refers to a set of assumptions that an algorithm uses to supplement the data it runs
to find a function.87 Frequently, attempts to find one final function using
information from the data alone are unsuccessful, leaving the algorithm with what
is known as an “ill-posed problem” where it is not possible to select a single best
answer using the information available.88 Collecting more data is almost always
not a viable way forward because the “data is not available or is too expensive to
collect.”89 So algorithms are fed—and apply to the available data—assumptions
about what the most desirable decision or prediction should look like. Obviously,
these kinds of assumptions could carry within them discriminatory biases. With
some level of transparency, we should be able to scrutinize them for that.
To enable these examples of ex ante scrutiny, some scholars have
proposed regulation which would require that administrative agencies publish
guidelines on software development.90 Others have argued for a legislative
environment that “protect[s] whistle-blowers and allow[s] a public interest cause
of action [to] aid in increasing detection of overt misdeeds in designing
software.”91 This kind of ‘technical accountability’92 is likely to be of limited
usefulness because even the best-calibrated methods can miss some programming
flaws.
More concerningly, analyzing source code on its own (static analysis) may
tell us nothing about how an algorithm will interact with the environment it is
eventually set into93 while analyzing the code as it runs in its natural field
(dynamic testing) still fails to guarantee whether or not a certain outcome—in this
case discrimination—will occur.94 The fact that some jurisdictions have no closed
86
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list of protected grounds only makes it more difficult to guarantee successful
implementation of any of these solutions.95 For these reasons, ex post scrutiny has
increasingly started to seem more promising.
2.

Ex Post Scrutiny

Ex post scrutiny has become incredibly attractive because, as has been
discussed in the preceding part of this article, algorithms are not entirely
decipherable even if their code is made easily available. Of course, in other
situations algorithm code might be unavailable for reasons touching on the
protection of intellectual property. In both scenarios, to know what an algorithm
will do, one must run it.96 Ex post scrutiny looks at probing outcomes that result
from such runs, asking the key question: how will the algorithm impact protected
cognate groups in its decision-making?97 Underlying this approach is the idea that
auditing outputs is useful for detecting some systematic disadvantaging of
particular groups on the basis of protected characteristics.
Researchers in the field of computer science are making strides in devising
methods that can be used to assess algorithmic output for unlawful discrimination.
For example, in 2017 Tramer and others pioneered a tool kit they called FairTest.
It combines different methodologies and metrics to find out ‘unwarranted
association’—strong correlations between the output of a machine learning
algorithm and the protected characteristics of a person.98 If such a method is
perfected and widely deployed, it will allow the isolation and real-life testing of
algorithms to be an incredibly productive enterprise insofar as preventing
discrimination is concerned.99
Apart from these technical advances, legal scholars are also proposing
ways to prevent algorithmic discrimination starting at the examination of
outcomes. In one piece, Gillis and Spiess propose an approach they refer to as
“discrimination stress testing” in which an agent picks a hypothetical environment
in which the algorithm is designed to run and evaluates the outcome when the
algorithm is used.100 The agent should be attentive to issues like population of
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protected groups when selecting the hypothetical environment.101 Once this is
done, the agent can review whether the algorithm will result in increased
disparities for protected groups, and finally, whether those disparities are
unacceptable.102 Importantly, the last review requires already existing data on the
protected group in question within that environment.
In a more recent article, Gillis develops the idea further.103 Her proposal
takes the following step-by-step route: a) a decision on inputs is taken and a
function is generated by an initial algorithm; b) a second algorithm is
programmed with that function and thereafter applied to a dataset of people to see
the distribution produced; and c) there is an evaluation of the outcome to
determine whether the decision made by the second algorithm is
discriminatory.104 Here, Gillis contributes the idea about how to measure the
outcome for discrimination asserting that a reviewer needs to be attentive to any
absolute disparities or incremental expansion of disparities faced by protected
groups. While the former can be noted easily,105 the latter requires that a baseline
of data already exists.106
The importance of baseline data comes into sharper focus when one
considers the most advanced methods of measuring outcome fairness for
decisions made by algorithms. Consider Deborah Hellman’s ‘error ratio parity’
method, which is one of the most carefully constructed ones.107 It makes the case
for reviewers to measure algorithmic fairness using a method in which one
compares an algorithm’s false positive and false negative rates for the different
cognate groups in its environment.108 Crucially, this method requires a reviewer’s
constant reference to already-existing baseline data to find out whether an
algorithm’s decision-making expands or reduces disparities suffered by protected
groups.109
101

Id. at 481–84.
See id. at 484–87.
103
Gillis, supra note 50 (manuscript at 35–36).
104
Id. (manuscript at 68–69).
105
See generally Mark MacCarthy, Fairness in algorithmic decision-making, BROOKINGS (Dec. 6,
2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/fairness-in-algorithmic-decision-making/ (applying an
80% rule of thumb would allow reviewer to see if the results of an algorithm are discriminatory).
106
Gillis, supra note 50 (manuscript at 74–76).
107
See Hellman, supra note 12, at 835–42.
108
Id. at 835–39.
109
Id. at 840–41; see also Sandra Wachter et al., Bias Preservation in machine Learning: The
Legality of Fairness Metrics Under EU Non-Discrimination Law, 123 W. VA. L. REV. 735, 761–
64 (2020) (claiming even an algorithm which has no disparate impact and causes no expansion of
inequality can still be discriminatory, proposing use of “bias transformation” metrics instead of
“bias preservation” metrics to respond to ensure more fairness for protected group).
102

55

Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet — Vol. 13

There is another way of carrying out ex post scrutiny of algorithms. It is
premised on the claim that the auditing of outcomes will always fall short because
there are only a finite number of inputs that can be tested and outcomes which can
be observed.110 This does not mean all ex post scrutiny is unreliable. The direction
some scholars claim we must take is ex post analysis of outcomes which evaluates
properties of the software being used.111 For example, these properties include
whether undisclosed elements are recorded or whether the elements are consistent
among decision subjects as appropriate (to confirm whether all decisions, for
example, result from the same function).112
One of the understated attractions of ex post scrutiny is its allowance for
the possibility of redesigning algorithms to correct for discrimination after the
fact.113 Once an outcome is audited and disparate impact or unacceptable
expansion in disparities is flagged (which is not possible for ex ante scrutiny), a
decision can be made to reject the responsible algorithm and adopt a new one.114
The only serious contentions against this kind of “tuning”115 come out of a
uniquely American strife regarding the legality of affirmative action.116 The major
issue there can be summed up as the idea that taking into account a person’s
protected characteristics to fix disparate impact is itself disparate treatment.
Thankfully, this is an uncertainty which most other countries across the world
have long overcome. Consequently, in most countries one would not need to rely
on elaborate legal maneuvers117 to recreate fair algorithms based on findings from
ex post scrutiny.
Outcome scrutiny of the nature discussed in the preceding paragraphs is
not as novel as it may seem to some. A close iteration of it, in the form of field
experiments, has long been used to test for discrimination in employment and
consumer transaction decisions.118 And as Annette Zimmerman, Elena Di Rosa
and Hochan Kim incisively observed, pharmaceutical products have always had
110
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to go through several rounds of trials and tests before receiving approval for
use.119 It is also similar to ‘bank stress testing,’ which requires selected banks to
report their stability under hypothetical macroeconomic scenarios.120 With such
context in mind, the human rights impact assessments that the United Nations
Special Rapporteur for freedom of expression has pressed states and companies to
conduct prior to deploying AI systems does not seem too much to ask.121
Of course, ex post scrutiny of algorithms still has some shortcomings.
Dynamic self-learning algorithms constitute a stern test since they change their
functions so regularly that it is difficult for any reviewer to keep up.122 Consider
for example the fact that in 2018, the Google algorithm updated over 3,234
times.123 By the time one outcome review is complete, the algorithm will be using
a new function.124 It is hard to determine how such algorithms can be audited
from an outcome-focused perspective. Furthermore, the pervasive disagreements
about the outer limits of the discrimination doctrine will continue to dog any
efforts to conduct outcome-based scrutiny. Finally, as stated earlier, it is not
possible for a reviewer to be entirely certain about the final outcome an algorithm
will have. Even the best calibrated test environments can miss some critical
aspects of the final environment in which an algorithm is set to run.125 Although
all three are hard problems to solve, there seems to be consensus that ex post
scrutiny offers the best chances to prevent and prove discrimination in algorithmic
decision-making.126
b.

Foundation Required for Successful Implementation

A few things become have become clear amidst the concern of
discrimination in algorithmic decision-making. First, we cannot seriously expect
the vast majority of the people who will face algorithmic discrimination to start
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and sustain a suit. The knowledge gap between them and the entity using the
questionable algorithm will almost always be excessively wide, and their access
to necessary resources like computer and data science expertise will be limited.127
As a result, there is a need for a powerful and capable outside actor that will
police the use of algorithms in decision-making to ensure there is no resultant
discrimination.128 Writing in the context of algorithmic discrimination in labor
issues, for example, Aislinn Kelly-Lyth notes that: “Absent intervention from a
coordinating body with significant technical expertise, an individual is unlikely to
realize that they may have been disadvantaged by the employer’s use of an
algorithm—and even if they do, they will struggle to find any evidence to prove
it.”129 The institution in question cannot be the judiciary since judges have to wait
for cases to be brought before them. It cannot be a legislative body either since
legislatures have neither the staff nor the time to repeatedly carry out the kind of
intensive reviews and investigations necessary. The most viable institutions would
be new or already-existing independent commissions or regulatory agencies.130
Excellent examples of already-existing agencies leading the way can be
found in the United States. Consider: i) the Department of Housing and Urban
Development taking legal action against Facebook on the claim that its machinelearning algorithms were allowing advertisers to exclude people from seeing
certain listings based on protected characteristics131 ii) the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau assessing Upstart Network’s credit-scoring algorithms132 and
iii) the New York State Department of Financial Services opening an
127
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investigation into Apple Card’s algorithms.133 Moreover, the Algorithmic
Accountability Bill, still under consideration in the United States Congress,
empowers the Federal Trade Commission to supervise companies’ assessments of
their algorithms for inaccurate, unfair, biased or discriminatory decisions.134
The idea of existing agencies being given such purview has also taken root
in the United Kingdom, where recent analysis has, for instance, proposed a joint
role for the Equality and Human Rights Commission and Information
Commissioner’s office.135 There is also the possibility that a new agency is set-up
to conduct the kind of oversight this article argues is required. A 2017 article by
Andrew Tutt argues that the sort of institution which needs to be set up should be
the equivalent of “an FDA for algorithms.” He argues that while other subjectmatter agencies could also work, a central agency would be better because of the
complexity, opacity, and dangerousness that algorithms come with.136 While it is
interesting to consider, the debate Tutt brings up is beyond the ambit of this
article. I limit myself here to the claim that if we intend to effectively fight
discrimination arising from algorithmic decision-making, we need some agency
or independent commission to be accorded a primary role in the effort.
Setting standards and vigorously policing the use of algorithms (including
starting suits where necessary) would be the key tasks that such regulatory
agencies or independent commissions play. Indeed, Gillis and Spiess specifically
argue for regulators performing these kinds of tasks when they propose
“discrimination stress testing” of algorithms.137 Similarly, a 2019 report by
Brookings proposes the same kind of responsibilities for the selected regulatory
agencies.
A different approach would be to require disparate impact assessments for
automated decision systems used in the contexts covered by these laws. The
133
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assessments should be provided to the appropriate regulatory agency charged with
enforcing the anti-discrimination laws and to the public. Each agency could also
be assigned the responsibility to conduct its own disparate impact assessment, and
to have new authority, if necessary, to obtain data from developers and companies
for this purpose. Agencies could also be authorized to work with outside
researchers to conduct these assessments, and to approve certain researchers to
receive data from developers and companies to conduct these assessments.138
Having an outside actor to police algorithmic discrimination is crucial
because the affected parties—especially in developing countries—will almost
certainly not have the capacity to realize when an algorithm has discriminated
against them. The best institution, such an actor, can be a regulatory agency or an
independent commission/office.139
The second thing that becomes clear is that having non-governmental
actors with the resources and capacity to investigate discrimination in decisions
made by algorithms can make an incredible difference in ensuring fairness. When
such groups publish their findings, it makes communities more alert to the risks of
algorithms making decisions.140 This in turn leads to more caution and scrutiny,
which is surely a desirable development in the context of algorithmic decisionmaking.141 Often, governments will also decide to focus on the issue because of
the attention drawn to it by the groups this article has in mind.142
In countries where this has happened, the groups tend to be civil society
groups or news organizations.143 With regards to algorithmic decision-making in
particular, ProPublica has for example, been at forefront of investigations that
have illuminated possible discriminatory conduct.144 Some of their findings have
come from simply testing a tool (like Facebook’s advertising portal),145 others
have involved the intricate study of risk algorithm data carrying decision
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outcomes146 and their most famous one yet involved a rigorous, detailed analysis
of ten thousand criminal defendants’ algorithmically predicted recidivism rates
with their actual rates over a two-year period.147
The work of UK non-profit Foxglove also gives us a model for
reimagining the role that civil society needs to play in policing discrimination
where algorithmic decision-making is involved.148 In collaboration with the Joint
Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, the group filed a suit against UK’s Home
Department claiming that an algorithm used to make VISA decisions was
discriminatory.149 Before the case was heard and determined, the Home Office
decided to discontinue the use of the streaming tool,150 a clear win for the
claimants. Of particular interest to this study is how the suit was developed. It
appears that use of the tool only came to light when a group of lawyers were
shown the streaming process during a visit to a VISA processing center.151 The
suit also seems to have relied significantly on (a) information disclosed by the
Home Department during pre-action correspondence152 and (b) statistical data that
was already available.153 This brings us to the third prong of the foundation.
It is apparent is that there needs to be a certain level of public record
transparency and disclosure to defeat the enforcement gap that algorithmic
discrimination often entails.154 This claim is buttressed by existing cases of
impactful algorithmic scrutiny. Consider for instance how, as discussed in the
preceding paragraph, Foxglove was able to make its case against the UK
government’s VISA streaming tool. Consider what as well allowed ProPublica to
146
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critically assess COMPAS’s recidivism algorithm. The data analyzed was
acquired through public record requests and specifically Broward County’s
records because the state “had strong open record laws.”155 Without strong public
record transparency, such investigations would not be possible. This would deal a
hammer blow to any efforts to scrutinize algorithmic decision-making because, as
has been observed by others, statistical evidence is set to assume special
prominence in any attempts to prove algorithmic discrimination.156
Transparency around how algorithms have been trained and what rules or
models they are using will also be an important factor. Although there are
intellectual property issues likely at play,157 it would be difficult to carry out any
impactful ex ante scrutiny of algorithms without having access to some level of
data about how exactly they have been designed to work.

IV.

Implementing the Most Promising Proposed Solutions in Developing
Countries

To assess whether developing countries have the foundation necessary to
implement the most promising proposed solutions, I looked into the situation in
the following case studies: Kenya, India, Nigeria, South Africa, and the
Philippines. The details of my findings are in the annexure at the end of this
article.158 In this part, I will summarize those findings and thereafter propose a
strategy for moving forward.
On the policing of discrimination, this article found that all the countries
have some law that prohibits discrimination. Even though some have a more
comprehensive legal framework than others, it makes little difference at the end
of the day. Additionally, all the countries studied have some sort of independent
office set up to specifically protect people’s human rights. Nonetheless, there is
no evidence that any of these independent offices proactively polices
discrimination issues in their societies. In all the countries, it is left to the injured
party to approach an adjudicator. Furthermore, in all the countries studied,
executive agencies do not play any role in policing discrimination, and this has
always been the case.
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As expected, all the countries examined have countless non-government
actors. Still, there is no evidence that any of those actors is especially attentive to
algorithmic decision-making. Finally, while all the countries have a legal
framework that requires a laudable degree of public record transparency, it
remains rare and difficult for people to get the public records they seek. Private
entities are also not mandated to release any information that touches on how their
tools work. These countries therefore struggle when it comes to the three elements
of the foundation I staked out. Because of matching governance inefficiencies and
socio-economic conditions, I expect that the same will be true for a vast majority
of developing countries.
Given this situation, this article proposes a few steps going forward. First,
developing countries generally need to take discrimination on grounds of
protected characteristics more seriously and move past hollow commitments
towards verifiable action. It is very important for antidiscrimination advocates in
developing countries to ground the idea that discrimination is a public concern
that needs to be acted on by government.
Second, there need to be regular sophisticated statistical analyses that
examine where protected groups stand in the areas where algorithms are to be
deployed, for example credit-scoring. This can be made a legal for a country’s
bureau of statistics and all private entities which use algorithms, for example.
Open-record transparency also needs to progress from being only a legal norm on
paper to being affected in everyday life. Furthermore, developing countries should
consider mandating that private entities make transparent crucial details about
how some tools—especially algorithmic ones—are built to work. For example,
their training data or the functions and rules that they are use.
Third, there needs to be a reimagination of the role that the administrative
state plays in policing discrimination. This article argues that it would be best for
the administrative state to take up the role in developing countries since they have
the capacity and resources to proactively police discrimination. Independent
human rights commissions and offices would not be the most appropriate option
because those offices are rarely sufficiently resourced in these countries. Finally,
it may be necessary to revisit the burdens placed on litigants when it comes to
proving discrimination. In particular, the proportionality test-aligned requirement
that asks a litigant to propose a non-discriminatory alternative that still achieves
the goals set out is extremely onerous and may need to be reconsidered for cases
where algorithms are involved in the decision-making. Finally, developing
countries ought to explore the possibility of requiring that entities prove domestic
context has been considered in the design of an algorithm expected to run in their
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communities. As Chinmayi Arun notes, ‘the technology and capital that drives AI
firmly rests in Northern hands’159 and this could lead to algorithms running in
unexpected ways that cause discrimination in developing countries.

V.

Conclusion

This article has discussed the unique problems that algorithms pose for the
legal framework that has always been used to prevent and prove discrimination. It
has also showed why the solutions currently being mooted will struggle in
developing countries, which lack the foundation necessary for successful
implementation of the proposals. The situation is only made more concerning
when we realize that continuous use of algorithmic tools can easily build a
widespread belief that algorithms are infallible.160
In response, this article has staked out three foundational points that
antidiscrimination advocates in developing countries need to pay special attention
to if they are to ensure the existence of methods to guarantee that free and blind
use of algorithms does not become the norm. As Martha Minow has argued,
incautious deployment of algorithms in society can devalue personhood and leave
people subordinate to processes.161 The stakes are overwhelming, and we have no
choice but to confront the challenge.
There are other issues at play which we must grapple with. First, too many
developing countries have made hollow commitments to antidiscrimination while
endless forms of discrimination are allowed to thrive completely unchecked in
their societies. This will need to be courageously addressed. Second, these
countries must consider whether there is a need to prioritize antidiscrimination for
some protected grounds over others, if only because resources are limited and
productivity just as important. Both issues were beyond the scope of this article,
but it is hoped that future researchers will have more to say about them.

159

Arun, supra note 13, at 604.
Desai & Kroll, supra note 91, at 4.
161
U.S. Dep’t of State, Comm’n on Unalienable Rights Minutes 7 (2020).
160
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VI.

Annexure

a.

Use of algorithms in making impactful decisions

Country

Use of algorithms in decision making

Kenya

At the moment, algorithmic decision making in Kenya mainly
features in credit scoring.
Tala, a microloan company, uses algorithms to determine loan
eligibility. The smartphone app collects data on applicants to
assess credit risk. Some of the data includes, frequent contacts,
social media interactions and movement and routine habits, for
example, whether bills are paid on time. Tala offers this instant
credit scoring method as an alternative way for those who lack a
credit history.
Tala claims that it does not factor gender, race, ethnicity,
religion, national origin, sexual orientation, disability, medical
history or political opinion into its decisions.162 However, the
risk with its system is that those with less digital infrastructure
or lack of a digital footprint, might face unfair discrimination by
the algorithm that captures data more available in urban
populations.
Branch, like Tala, uses algorithms to assess loan eligibility by
examining, for example, amount of money in one’s mobile
money wallet and other loans one has. It considers social features
such as social media interaction as less useful than financial data.
Another credit scoring platform similar to Tala and Branch is
Saida.

162

TALA, supra note 8.
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FarmDrive is an alternative credit scoring platform for
smallholder farmers. It uses mobile phones, alternative data, and
machine learning to bridge the data gap between financial
institutions and the loan applicants (the farmers) which usually
prevents financial institutions from lending to creditworthy
smallholder farmers.
The Kenyan Government also recently released a statement
explaining that it intends to use algorithms to make decisions on
who to assign new housing units to.163
India

Private entities in India use algorithms to score creditworthiness.
Tala and Branch have operations in India and just as in Kenya,
they use their algorithms in a similar fashion to assess loan
eligibility of borrowers based on collected data.
SalaryDost, another lending platform, uses similar algorithms to
profile its customers by analyzing the applicant’s smartphone
metadata to gain understanding of the applicant’s behavior. This
information is used to make decisions with the credit risk of each
borrower in mind.
Other than that, police in India have been using an algorithmic
tool called Crime Mapping, Analytics and Predictive System for
predictive policing in places like Delhi, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh
and Rajasthan. Facial recognition tools have also been used
regularly.164

163

KENYA AFFORDABLE HOUSING PROGRAMME, Development Framework Guidelines (Oct.
2018), https://www.housingandurban.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/DevelopmentFramework-Guidelines-Release-Version.pdf.
164
Ramachandran Murugesan, Predictive policing in India: Deterring crime
or discriminating minorities, LSE HUMAN RIGHTS BLOG (Apr. 16, 2021),
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/humanrights/2021/04/16/predictive-policing-in-india-deterring-crime-ordiscriminating-minorities/ [https://perma.cc/75W2-NPU9].
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Algorithms have also been used in India’s education sector in
predicting school dropouts. Microsoft, through Azure Machine
learning, processes data comprising of “student performance,
school infrastructure and teacher skills” to find patterns among
school dropouts.

The government the directs schemes and

programs to those areas based on that information. Over 10,000
schools in Andhra use this algorithm to predict dropouts.
Nigeria

Like Kenya and India, credit scoring is tied to algorithmic
decision-making in Nigeria. Branch uses algorithms to assess
loan eligibility by examining, for example, amount of money in
one’s mobile money wallet and other loans one has. It considers
social features such as social media interaction as less useful than
financial data.
Other online lending platforms like Branch include, Paylater,
Palmcredit, QuickCheck, Aella Credit, KiaKia and FairMoney.

South Africa

Cmore is a portal that uses internal and external data to “conduct
surveillance, defense and policing operations.”165 Internal date
includes information by patrol units from the Cmore Mobile app,
for example, communication within the units and feedback from
surveillance; while external data is derived from outside sources
like drones or other sensors.166
Cmore uses this information to perform predictive analytics in
security to “allegedly prevent future crimes”. 167 Cmore uses

165

Michael Kwet, Cmore: South Africa’s New Smart Policing Surveillance
Engine, COUNTERPUNCH (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.counterpunch.org/2017/01/27/cmore-southafricas-new-smart-policing-surveillance-engine/.
166
Id.
167
Id.
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these features in partnership with the South African police to
prevent crimes such as theft, illicit drugs, and public protest.168
The

Algorithmic decision-making in the Philippines is also applied

Philippines

in credit scoring mobile applications to determine loan eligibility
of borrowers by analyzing data accessible to the app on the
borrowers’ mobile phones. This decision-making method bears
inherent biases as discussed earlier. The credit scoring mobile
apps in the Philippines are Tala and Lenddo.
Suggestions on use of algorithms to predict decisions of courts
exist.169 Decisions from courts can be analyzed and predictions
made on how similar cases might be determined in future. This
suggestion is meant to help lower courts reduce the backlog of
cases.170

b.
Proactive executive agency or independent commission policing
of discrimination
Country

Legal Framework

Kenya

Antidiscrimination

Policing of discrimination
law

is Executive

agencies

do

not

found in the Constitution, 171 participate in any issues to do
Employment Act (preventing with discrimination.
discriminatory

hiring While several human rights

processes) 172 , Persons with commissions exist, there is no
Disabilities Act (protecting evidence that any of them

168

Id.
M. B. L. Virtucio et al., Predicting Decisions of the Philippine Supreme Court Using Natural
Language Processing and Machine Learning, IEEE 42 ANNUAL COMPUTER SOFTWARE AND
APPLICATIONS CONFERENCE (COMPSAC) 130 (2018).
170
See id. at 135.
171
CONSTITUTION art. 27 (2010) (Kenya).
172
The Employment Act (2007) Cap. 226 § 5 (Kenya).
169
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persons with disability from proactively investigates issues to
discrimination)
National

173

and the do with discrimination.

Cohesion

and When rights are infringed upon,

Integration Act (prohibiting for

example

freedom

from

one

is

ethnic, racial and religious discrimination,
discrimination).174

empowered to institute court
175

proceedings.

Hence,

the

Judiciary comes in to settle
discrimination

disputes.

In

particular, the Employment and
Labor Relations Court handles
matters on discrimination arising
in the workplace.
There is no individual complaints
procedure

for

victims

of

discrimination under either the
Persons with Disabilities Act or
the Employment Act, both of
which provide for discrimination
to be a criminal offence.
India

Antidiscrimination law can Policing of discrimination in
be found in the Constitution, India is mainly carried out by an
The Persons with Disabilities independent
(Equal

commission

Opportunities, (lacking enforcement powers)

Protection of Rights and Full and the court system.
173

The Persons with Disabilities Act (2002) Cap. 133 (Kenya).
The National Cohesion and Integration Act, No. 12 (2008) (Kenya).
175
CONSTITUTION art. 22 (2010) (Kenya).
174
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Participation) Act (protecting The Protection of Human Rights
against discrimination on the Act creates a National Human
ground of disability), Equal Rights

Commission.

Remuneration Act, Maternity powers
Benefit

Act

of

the

177

The

commission

(protecting include, to investigate human

against on the ground of rights violations,178 but there is
maternity

status),

Hindu evidence

that

Succession Act, Transgender investigates
Persons

(Protection

Rights)

Act

it

proactively

touching

on

of discrimination.

(protecting Executive

agencies

do

not

transgender persons against directly participate in any issues
discrimination)
Scheduled

and to do with discrimination.
Caste

and

Scheduled Tribe (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act.
Article 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18
of Constitution of India also
promote
citizens

equality
and

of

all

prohibits

discrimination.176
Nigeria

Anti-discrimination law in Policing of discrimination is
Nigeria has its foundation in supposed to be done by the
the

Constitution,

Discrimination
Persons

with

the Human
Against (which

Rights
lacks

Commission
implementation

Disabilities powers) and by the court system.

176

India Const. art. 14–18.
The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1994, § 3 (India).
178
Id. at § 12.
177
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(Prohibition) Act (prohibiting The executive is not involved in
discrimination on the ground policing discrimination.
of disability)179 and the HIV The National Human Rights
and

AIDS

Anti- Commission exists but it faces

Discrimination Act.180

major challenges with regards to
its

independence

and

effectiveness.181

179

Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities (Prohibition) Act (2019), § 1 (Nigeria).
HIV and AIDS (Anti-Discrimination) Act (2014), § 1 (Nigeria).
181
Abuja Ameh Ochojila & Lagos Silver Nwokoro, Stakeholders examine National Human Rights
Commission’s struggles on its mandate, THE GUARDIAN (July 13, 2021),
https://guardian.ng/features/law/stakeholders-examine-national-human-rights-commissionsstruggles-on-its-mandate/.
180
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South Africa The

law

against The administrative state plays an

discrimination can be found insignificant role in policing
in

the

Constitution,

the discrimination. Further, policing

Promotion of Equality and of discrimination by independent
Prevention

of

Unfair commissions such as the South

Discrimination Act and the African
Employment Equity Act.

Human

Rights

Commission is not vigorous

Section 9 of the Constitution enough

because

they

lack

also entitles everyone to adequate enforcement powers184.
equality before the law.182

Equality Courts

185

determine

The Employment Equity Act discrimination cases lodged by
purposes to create equity in affected

parties,

the workplace not only by parties,

commissions

interested
or

for

treating everyone equally but public interest. Equality Courts
also

by

accommodating offer relief in the form of, among

differences.183

others,
interim

declaratory
orders,

orders,
damages,

preventing unfair discriminatory
practices or ordering for an
unconditional apology.186
The

Article II Section 14 of the The executive branch is not

Philippines

Constitution

provides

182

for directly involved in policing

S. AFR. CONST., 1996.
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 § 6 (S. Afr.).
184
John C. Mubangizi, A comparative discussion of the South African and Ugandan Human
Rights Commissions, 48 COMPAR. & INT’L L.J. 124, 141 (2015).
185
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 § 16 (S. Afr.).
186
Id. at § 21.
183
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equality of men and women discrimination. The Commission
before the law,
Article

III

187

while on Human Rights is supposed to

Section

1 do so, but there is no evidence

guarantees equal protection that it usually does.
of the law to all persons.188

c.

Vigilant non-government actors attentive to algorithmic decision-

making
Country

Attention of civil society groups towards algorithmic
decision-making

Kenya

There is no evidence of non-government groups being attentive
to algorithmic decision-making.

India

The National Institution for Transforming India (NITI Aayog) is
a government think tank that maps out strategies, policies, and
programs for the Indian government to foster development.
It designed an AI strategy for India. NITI in their strategy
acknowledges

that

algorithmic

decision-making

bears

shortcomings because they are subject to human judgement and
limitations including inherent biases and discrimination.189 NITI
suggests that at first a “reactive approach” to reduce bias will be
undertaken before AI can achieve complete neutrality despite
bias.190

187

CONST., (1987), art. II, § 14 (Phil.).
Id. at art. III, § 1.
189
See generally EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR COMMUNICATIONS
NETWORKS, CONTENT AND TECHNOLOGY, State of the Art Report: Algorithmic Decision Making
(2018), https://actuary.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/AlgoAware-State-of-the-ArtReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8BA-9VXE].
190
Id. at 100.
188
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There are no outside groups with a focus on monitoring
algorithmic decision-making in India.
Nigeria

There is no evidence of a non-government group that is attentive
to algorithmic decision-making.

South Africa

There is no evidence of a non-government group that is attentive
to algorithmic decision-making.

The

There is no evidence of a non-government group that is attentive

Philippines

to algorithmic decision-making.

d.

A well-rooted culture of transparency

Country

Legal

Framework

on Public

record

Transparency and Access to transparency
Information
Kenya

Transparency is a national value In

2016,

Transparency

binding all state actors. 191 The International
Constitution

calls

for through

Kenya,
the

County

transparency from Parliament,192 Governance Status Report,
financial

institutions,

193

the revealed that Kenya was yet

public service194 and the national to adopt open budgetary
police195 in particular.

processes. Information on

The Constitution accords citizens
the right of access to information
held by the state or necessary in
191

CONSTITUTION art. 10 (2010) (Kenya).
Id. at art. 230.
193
Id.
194
Id. at art. 232.
195
Id. at art. 242.
192
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to
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the protection of their rights. 196 services

were

delivered

The Access to Information Act poorly.198
that puts into practice access to
information.197

Further, public offices fail to
respond to requests of access
to information 199 within the
statutory given framework
of 21 days.200 Most of these
requests are either ignored or
receive negative responses
after a very long time.201

India

The right of access to information Although India has set up an
is provided in the Right to e-government in the hope
Information

202

Act.

The that people and business will

objective of the Act is to promote be
transparency
practical

by

able

to

access

providing government information at

measures

for

fulfillment of the right.

the any time,203 there is no proof
of any culture of public
record transparency.

196

Id. at art. 35.
Access to Information Act, No. 31 (2016) KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 152.
198
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL KENYA, The Kenya County Governance Status Report (2016),
https://tikenya.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/county-governance-status-report.pdf.
199
Vincent Ng’ethe, GUIDE: How to use your right to government information in
Kenya, AFR. CHECK (July 23, 2018), https://africacheck.org/factsheets/guide-how-to-use-yourright-to-government-information-in-kenya/ [https://perma.cc/5DU7-Y3SL].
200
Access to Information Act, supra note 197, at § 9(1).
201
See Ng’ethe, supra note 199.
202
Right to Information Act, 2005 (India).
203
M. Alshehri & S. Drew, Implementation of e-Government: Advantages and Challenges, INT’L
J. ELEC. BUS. 79, 81 (2011).
197
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Nigeria

The right to access information is Prior to the Act, access to
guaranteed by the Freedom of information
Information Act.204

was

not

established and transparency
was

absent

in

administration.

public

In

fact,

request for information was
met with claims of the
classified

nature

of

information

which

was

protected by the Official
205

Secrets Act.

One may

request for the information
even

without

specific

showing

interest

in

that

information.206
As of 2020, responses to
requests

for

information

from government are low,
and sometimes the requests
are ignored altogether.
Even

when

judgments
204

courts
in

favor

207

give
of

Freedom of Information Act 2011 (Nigeria).
Felicia Segun, The Law of Freedom of Information
in Nigeria, https://digitalrightslawyers.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/01/WIG_April2012_Segun_N
igeria.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2022).
206
Freedom of Information Act 2011, supra note 204, at § 1(2).
207
Why We Have Not Given Up on Processes: Making FOI Requests in Nigeria, PARADIGM
INITIATIVE (May 11, 2020), https://paradigmhq.org/making-foi-requests-in-nigeria/
[perma.cc/U8RT-BWTP].
205
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applicants, enforcement of
these judgments against the
government is difficult.208
South Africa

The Constitution mandates that Responses

to

requests

for

transparency be present in public information range from full
administration and that information disclosure to silence. 214 Some
is accessible. 209 Transparency also of the requests for information
binds the various legislative bodies are ignored. 215 Sometimes the
in the processes they undertake, 210 government believes that the
for

example,

the

budgetary information they provide may

process.211

be used against them, leading

The right of access to information
held by the state or information
necessary in protecting one’s right is
given to every person.212 This right
is put into effect by the Promotion of
Access to Information Act.213

to any request for information
to be rejected or not considered
at all. 216 When a request for
information is not responded to
one cannot know the reasons
that led to the non-response.217
There is no central office or
agency
established

208

that
to

has

been

deal

with

Id.
S. AFR. CONST., 1996 §195.
210
Id. at §§ 57, 70, 116.
211
Id. at § 215.
212
Id. at § 32.
213
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (S. Afr.).
214
D. Marais et al., The role of Access to Information in Enabling Transparency and Public
Participation in Governance: A case study of Access to Policy Consultation Records in South
Africa, 9 AFR. J. PUB. AFF. 36, 44.
215
Id. at 39.
216
Id.
217
Id. at 45.
209
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requests for information.

218

Therefore,

of

enforcement

transparency and access to
information

laws

is

insufficient.

The

South Africans have a right to Requests

for

access

to

Philippines

information that concerns the public information vary in responses
and access to official state decisions, depending on the agency or
records, and documents is to be public office involved.222 Some
granted

to

the

citizens.

219

entities are more forthcoming

Additionally, the state is mandated with information when they
to adopt a policy of “full disclosure” trust that the release of that
on matters of public interest.220 The information

will

lead

to

Executive Order No. 2 of 2016 reforms.223
(Freedom of Information Order)
gives effect to the right.221

For the Supreme Court, when
the

correct

requesting

procedure

in

access

to

information is followed and if
the information requested is
not confidential, requests for
218

Obotsamang Maropo, The Lack of Accountability and Transparency in Local Government in
South Africa (2014) (Master’s thesis, University of the Free State) (on file
with on KovsieScholar, University of the Free State).
219
CONST., (1987), art. III, § 7 (Phil.).
220
Id. at art. II, § 28.
221
Office of the President, Operationalizing in the Executive Branch the People’s Constitutional
Right to Information and the State Policies to Full Public Disclosure and Transparency in the
Public Service and Providing Guidelines, Exec. Ord. No. 2 (July 23, 2016) (Phil.),
https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2016/07/23/executive-order-no-02-s-2016/.
222
Alexander Furnas, Transparency Case Study: Public Procurement in the
Philippines, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Oct. 7, 2013, 5:56
PM), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2013/10/07/case-study-public-procurement-in-thephilippines/ [perma.cc/4QFJ-JDPE].
223
Id.
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information yield a grant of
access

to

the

information

without many impediments.224

e.
Regularly released statistical analyses touching on the disparities
faced by protected groups
Country
Available statistics of disparities faced by protected groups
Kenya

Reports and statistics analyzing disparities faced by protected
groups are not systematic but rather one-time analyses. The
reports do not contain a record of whether the disparities are
increasing or decreasing. The existing statistics state that
inequalities exist, and some offer specific figures (percentages)
on the disparities which is not comprehensive enough.

Nigeria

With a few exceptions, 225 reports and statistics analyzing
disparities faced by protected groups are not systematic but
rather one-time analyses.

South Africa

The focus of existing analyses is on gender 226 and race. 227
These are only two of the protected characteristics under South
African antidiscrimination law.

224

See Merceidez Ragaza, Philippines: The right to know – Freedom of information in the
Supreme Court, IN-HOUSE CMTY. (Feb. 8,
2019), https://www.inhousecommunity.com/article/right-know-freedom-information-supremecourt/ [perma.cc/E9X3-D6EL].
225
Gender in Nigeria Report 2012: Improving the Lives of Girls and Women in Nigeria, BRITISH
COUNCIL NIGERIA (2012), https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/gender-nigeria-report-2012improving-lives-girls-and-women-nigeria.
226
Women and Men in South Africa, CTR. STAT. (1998),
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/WomenAndMen/WomenAndMen1995.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2R7X-U9MR].
227
Gender Series Volume IV: Economic Empowerment 2001–2017 Report, STAT. S. AFR. (Sept.
27, 2018), http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=11591 [perma.cc/9PS7-V3HT].
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The

The statistics authority releases fact sheets on women and men

Philippines

(indicating any disparities that could be present) each year.228
The fact sheets contain categories including, health, education,
economic participation, employment, among others. However,
these fact sheets do not comprehensively analyze the disparities
faced by protected classes.
Statistics on ethnic inequalities are frequently published
analyzing the progress of the inequalities across the years.229
They indicate among others the levels of schooling, literacy and
access to services.

228

PSA Issues Updates on Women and Men in the Philippines, PHIL. STAT. AUTH. (Mar. 9,
2021), https://psa.gov.ph/gender-stat [perma.cc/3KRV-87JA].
229
See generally Celia M. Reyes, Christian D. Mina, & Ronina D. Asis, Inequality of
Opportunities Among Ethnic Groups in the Philippines (Phil. Inst. Dev. Stud. Discussion Paper
Series No. 2017-42 3, 2017),
https://pidswebs.pids.gov.ph/CDN/PUBLICATIONS/pidsdps1742.pdf [perma.cc/7ZH6-ATXB].
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